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Introduction1 
One of the main elements of the scientific paradigm of seventeenth-century 
mechanism was the formulation of a limited number of simple laws or rules. 
This effort was aimed at collecting the multiplicity of phenomena and the 
virtually infinite plurality of the observed reality under their interpretative 
umbrella. To do this, it was both necessary and desirable to leave aside 
singular and exceptional cases in order to construct instead a general 
normativity that embraced reality as a whole. Descartes was one of these 
philosophers whose interest was unequivocally focused on the rule as a 
description of the general course of things. His interest, that is to say, was in 
the rule rather than the exception, in physiology rather than pathology, and 
in normality rather than monstrosity. 
However, despite this explicit methodological approach, Descartes' 
entire work is haunted by phantoms, oddities, and monstrosities. Between 
metaphors and analogies, like a phoenix, the monster rises up continuously 
in the works of Descartes. What I suggest in this article is that Cartesian 
philosophy as a whole is a ‘teratomachy’: a war, in other words, waged 
against a certain idea of monstrosity. The fact that monstrosity remains 
alluded to, often only hinted at and apparently peripheral, does anything 
but diminish its importance. On the contrary, its allusional character 
stimulates the interest of the reader in the use of these tropes and adds to 
their hermeneutic depth. 
The monster is constantly pushed to the margins by Descartes, yet 
remains the main challenge both to his thought and to the new philosophy, 
neither of which could afford the luxury of leaving any phenomena 
unexplained. The monster is therefore evoked, touched upon, and then 
embraced and neutralized with powerful metaphors whose function is 
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precisely to disempower its subversive character. Our task, then, is to 
analyze the various figures of monstrosity in order to shed light on one of 
the main theoretical problems of the mechanistic philosophy as it traversed 
the entire seventeenth century.2 
In my view, monstrosity has a rhetorical significance in Descartes that is 
anything but marginal, along with a theoretical function of the utmost 
importance. Its meaning can be explained only by understanding the 
polemical movement out of which it arose: in the tension, that is, between 
the need to marginalize and neutralize monstrous exception, and the explicit 
intention to use it theoretically so as to confirm the rule and the normal. This 
is not a contradiction on the part of Descartes. On the contrary, it is a 
necessary and productive ambiguity that points to the need to use to his 
own advantage one of the most challenging theoretical challenges of 
seventeenth-century mechanistic philosophy.  
This ambiguity is particularly apparent in his writings on medicine, 
embryology, and physiology.3 Critics have repeatedly stressed the limits of 
Cartesian philosophy in these fields. Without wishing to step into the shoes 
of the "avocat attardé de la cause cartésienne" suggested by Pierre Mesnard 
in the late 1930s,4 I believe that these limits are more interesting if 
interpreted as productive tensions arising from the spirit of the new era, 
rather than as signs of backwardness or delays in an imagined history of 
scientific achievements, or stories of "magnificent and progressive fates." 
Even so, we still need to pinpoint the moment when these kinds of tensions 
begin to give rise to real difficulties in a system. In his highly perceptive 
analysis of the work of Gueroult, George Canguilhem gave a very good 
description of this overlap of productive tensions and hermeneutic 
difficulties in Cartesianism, offering at the same time an important lesson on 
historical method.5 
In an incisive analysis of theodicy in the time of Descartes, Sergio 
Landucci, in his turn, has shown that there is an implicit tension between the 
content of the Fourth Meditation, and the final part of the Sixth Meditation. 
This ambiguity allows for two opposing solutions to the theme of “evil” and 
its justification within the Cartesian system. On the one hand, we have 
Leibniz extolling the perfection of creation in an effort to take what we 
might define as an Augustinian view to its extreme consequences. On the 
other, we have Malebranche and then Bayle who instead overturned this 
view to exalt the wisdom of the Creator, at the cost of admitting 
imperfection into the created world.6 
Now, although the link between "evil" and "monstrosity" is evident, I do 
not believe that the two concepts fully coincide. To interpret the monster 
only as a particular case or special application of a more general concept of 
evil diminishes its theoretical and scientific interest. The theological problem 
of the justification of the created world does not correspond exactly to the 
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physical violation – real or apparent – of the rules and laws through which 
nature works. Without providing a precise definition of monstrosity,7 
therefore, I suggest that its study must be intertwined with the problem of 
theodicy, opening up the inquiry, however, onto further points of 
philosophical and scientific interest. 
In order to show this, I will first analyze the main figures of monstrosity 
in Cartesian philosophy, showing their rhetorical impact and theoretical 
function. I will explain how they are essential to the very foundation of the 
Cartesian system. The notions of the evil genius and the deceiver God, 
which must be considered separately within the broader issue of theodicy, 
instead converge and join forces in the two-faced figure of radical 
monstrosity. It is a figure to which the Cartesian subject must respond 
forcefully in the search for a cornerstone to hold up the entire system. This 
inquiry will necessarily entail an examination of the peculiar status that 
Admiration holds in the Cartesian economy of the passions. On the one 
hand, Admiration draws constantly on the conceptual sphere of 
monstrosity; on the other, it moves towards a positive knowledge of the rare 
and "singular".  
I will also analyze a passage from the Cogitationes circa generatione 
animalium, the only text in which Descartes explicitly discusses physical 
monstrosities. I will argue that these pages, in which Descartes subscribes to 
a rigidly mechanistic, epigenetic view of embryology, are in tension with 
other parts of his work, especially with the doctrine of final causes and the 
idea of continuous creation. The theme of monstrosity is thus revealed as a 
tool for assessing the internal coherence of Cartesian thought. 
 
Divertissements and true knowledge 
Descartes is probably the first philosopher of the modern age to use juridical 
terminology in a systematic and conscious way to describe mechanical 
phenomena. Starting from the early 1630s, and in particular with the Le 
monde, Scholastic philosophy was systematically put into question, not only 
with regard to its content, but also and especially with regard to its 
language.8 It was in the language of laws, norms, and rules that the 
metaphorical constellation serving as a backdrop for rational mechanics, and 
more generally for the philosophy of the new era, began to be expressed.9 
But Descartes did not limit himself to the use of legal metaphors. Legal 
language was also assigned the essential function of mediating between the 
new image of nature and the new science whose task it was to describe it.10 
Descartes was also, therefore, among the first to explain what a law is, how 
it depends on God and how it is impossible – despite His absolute freedom – 
that this world or others be subject to a different kind of normativity. In the 
Cartesian lexicon, the law became the key to understanding nature and its 
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necessity. Knowledge of causes – the only one that made sense in the new 
scientific context – necessarily had to be attained by describing the general 
laws by which phenomena are produced.  
The question of investigating general rules rather than focusing on the 
exceptions and special cases typically pursued by the previous philosophy is 
at the heart of the Cartesian research program from the time of the Recherche 
de la verité.11 Descartes does his best to stage the opposition between a 
method of inquiry that heads directly to the gathering of general rules 
versus one that dallies with unique and exceptional cases, unnecessarily 
delaying the progress of knowledge.12 Epistemon insists on knowing more 
about some of the “special” difficulties in each science, such as human 
contrivances, apparitions, illusions and all the marvelous effects attributed 
to magic. Not so that he can become a magician, by any means, but "in order 
to prevent our judgement from being beguiled by wonder at something of 
which it is ignorant".13 Descartes leaves the matter suspended here, and 
Epistemon's questions remain unanswered. The philosophical and scientific 
program of Eudoxus, on the other hand, is set out in clear terms.  
Human life has objective limits. An economy of knowledge must thus 
be constructed with care, without dissipating the little energy we have at our 
disposal. It would be folly to pass over the most useful and necessary things 
to learn how to speak "Swiss" or "Lower Breton" or, even worse, to study all 
the herbs and stones that come from the Indies, behold the Phoenix, and, in 
short, all the marvels of nature.14 A "science"' of the monstrous would fall 
under this category, but would be vain curiositas and an unnecessary waste 
of energy. Better then to cast doubt on these things, cast doubt on 
everything, and rebuild the foundations of knowledge, not on the 
accumulative "plenitude" of sterile erudition, but on the emptiness of a 
radical doubt that has little or nothing to do with marvels, monstrosities, 
miracles, and prodigies. The uncertainty caused by doubt – continues 
Eudoxus – may make you afraid. But it is like the empty images that alarm 
us in the dark of night: if we flee them, they follow us; but if we approach 
them, as if to touch them, our fear vanishes in an instant.15 
There is undoubtedly a "science of miracles", which can even be 
considered a part of mathematics and which serves to reveal the illusions 
that the magicians claim to produce using demons. Descartes speaks to 
Mersenne about this in the Fall of 1629. Even though he despises these 
things, they could at least serve as a pleasant (although useless) 
divertissement.16 Better in any case to leave aside these chimeras, monsters 
and phantoms of all sorts, to turn to the construction of a system which only 
has room for general rules, universal experiences, and normal phenomena.17 
That is why the exceptional, the miraculous, and the monstrous 
apparently remain outside the system. There is simply no place for them, 
because they are neither useful nor interesting. This is where early 
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mechanism differs substantially from its fully mature version. Distinguished 
Cartesians in subsequent decades will feel obliged to amply and explicitly 
address monstrosity, understood as the "exception" that puts the system to 
the test and which, therefore, demands an explanation.18 The rule is saved 
from the exception only to the extent it is able to explain, justify and take the 
exception into account. 
And yet, the monster reappears when we least expect it. For example, 
alongside the peaceful, carefree walks along the canals of Amsterdam, 
another image of the philosopher begins to emerge. He presents his 
philosophy as a veritable war against monstrosity. With determination, he 
enters into the labyrinth of ignorance. Armed with the weapons of the new 
method, he adventures where no one has dared to go before, to confront the 
monster of ignorance face to face and eventually defeat it: "In hoc uno totius 
humanæ industriæ summa continetur, atque hæc regula non minus 
servanda est rerum cognitione agressurro, quam Thesei filum labyrinthum 
ingressuro."19 
Once again, the monster is not named, yet the reference is clear. This 
hunting expedition against the Minotaur of ignorance, a monstrous 
metaphor of erring reason, of knowledge based on affirmations which lack a 
method, is no less violent than Plato's attack on the Sophists expressed in 
terms of fishing. The battle Descartes wages against this type of monstrosity, 
which lies hidden in his prose, is precisely what we need to bring to the 
surface. In order to grasp the exact rhetorical and hermeneutic function of 
monstrosity in his philosophy, we need to reactivate what he himself 
deployed to neutralize, tame, and finally destroy it.  
 
The Center and the Periphery:  
The Function of Anomalies in Cartesian Philosophy 
To define the theoretical scope of monstrosity for someone like Descartes 
who rarely speaks of it directly, and who consciously strives to relegate it to 
the margins of his system, entails a particular interpretative strategy. In the 
following section we will bring into view the theoretical value of 
monstrosity, and even more importantly, we will directly address its 
polemical scope. As we shall see, the only way to define the concept of 
monstrosity is by allowing it to emerge out of the conflictual movement 
which tends to eliminate it. One of Descartes' undertakings is to reject the 
monstrous, to exile it beyond the margins of a method concerned with the 
general laws of the universe.  
This objective is only partially achieved, however. In reality, the 
monstrous continues to lay siege to the entire system, from the outside, and 
to threaten the system with its theoretically subversive potential. Descartes 
is fully aware of this polemical tension. To safeguard the esprit de système he 
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is perfectly willing to expel the singular, the rare and the monstrous from his 
inquiry. But, at the same time, he is quite cognizant of the immense 
theoretical implications that the problem of monstrosity poses to the 
mechanical philosophy. His challenge, therefore, is to "tame" these figures, at 
the same time neutralizing their potentially subversive character and putting 
them to work by giving them a positive function: the function, namely, of 
explaining and confirming the rule to which they claim to be the exception. 
This tension runs throughout all the major works of Descartes, as well 
as through his correspondence. Although man does not understand many of 
the things in the world, "it would be irrational for us to doubt what we do 
understand correctly just because there is something which we do not 
understand and which, so far as we can see, there is no reason why we 
should understand."20 What we do not understand is not essential and does 
not put into question what is clearly understandable. The exception, 
therefore, is marginalized. It is driven outside the core of the system, to a 
place where it is rendered harmless because it does not require any further 
investigation. 
At the same time, however – and this is a symptom of the productive 
tension and ambiguity at work in Cartesian thought – he strives 
continuously to show that apparently inexplicable phenomena are actually 
comprehensible, whenever the method and the conclusions of the new 
philosophy are employed: "There is no phenomenon of nature which I have 
omitted to consider in this treatise."21 Part IV of the Principia dwells on a 
series of phenomena that are prodigious or regarded as such, and that can 
easily be accommodated within a fully mechanistic explanation.  
The same oscillation can be found in Letter CXCIX of July 30, 1640 to 
Mersenne, in which Descartes focuses on the subject of birthmarks, spots 
impressed on the fetus by the mother's imagination. Descartes offers a 
mechanistic, although somewhat elliptical explanation22 which attempts to 
tie the topic into the curious description of an infant born with the same 
fracture of the arm that its mother had while pregnant.23 The curiosity stems 
from the fact that the baby was supposedly healed by applying the same 
remedies that had been applied to the mother. In any case, the principles of 
his philosophy appear sufficient to explain this apparently prodigious 
phenomenon. 
At stake is whether the mother's imagination is to be considered 
responsible for the malformations of her new-born child, in other words, for 
the production of monsters.24 Descartes' hesitancy is obvious. Just at the 
point where the argument could take an interesting turn and sweep away all 
the absurd explanations of the old philosophy, he draws up short, right at 
the threshold. Monstrosity, only evoked, seems neglected or kept at a 
distance. Yet, in the same letter – this is how the tension manifests as a 
symptom – Descartes insists on the fact that the principles of his mechanism 
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specifically explain these apparently inexplicable phenomena much better 
than any other hypothesis. The "silk", for example, that grows on a girl's 
forehead, or the thorn that blooms on the body of a Spaniard – the 
prodigious cases mentioned by Mersenne – should perhaps be investigated 
more thoroughly. But in any case, 
Concerning your statement that it is not possible to explain this 
phenomenon by referring to no other principle of life than heat, it 
seems to me on the contrary that this explanation served better 
than any other. For heat being a principle common to animals, 
plants and other bodies, it is not surprising that it serves to endow 
man and plant with life. In contrast, if there were a need for a 
principle of life in plants that was not of the same type as that 
which exists in animals, these could not be compatible.25  
There are two moves played out in this passage. The exceptional and 
prodigious cases, the marginal and monstrous figures, are kept at a distance, 
away from the center of the system. At the same time, they are reintegrated, 
whenever possible and even at the cost of providing poorly structured 
explanations, in order for them to be neutralized and used to confirm the 
general principles of the system. Given the fact that these figures are 
anything but absent, it behooves us to explain their theoretical function. 
The first thing to observe is that Descartes' writings are populated by a 
plethora of figures that are "marginal", hybrid, semi-pathological, borderline 
– in a word, monstrous. Not only do these sorts of tropes crowd the pages, 
their position and rhetorical function are anything but marginal. They 
abound, for example, in Letter CDLX of November 23, 1646 to William 
Cavendish, Marquis of Newcastle, his English friend with the "geometric 
mind."26 Descartes returns to the theme of the primacy and uniqueness of 
"human" nature compared to animal nature. But no animal is capable of 
thought except for man. Although some of the beasts are stronger or better 
endowed than we are for certain functions, they still remain "animals" 
nonetheless. The only property that is typically and exclusively human is 
thought or reason. 
But how can he demonstrate this clearly to his friend Cavendish? This is 
the challenge that gives rise to a series of monstrous and prodigious figures 
used to illustrate and validate Descartes' argument. Sleepwalkers, for 
example, accomplish prodigious feats, evidently without the use of reason.27 
An even stronger argument, says Descartes, is that only communication 
through words or signs unequivocally shows the humanity of the human 
animal. That we are talking about words and signs must be specified in 
order to include the "deaf and dumb" but exclude "parrots", which may 
certainly utter articulate sounds but cannot speak. And where in this 
taxonomy are "madmen" to be placed? In the human domain, of course, 
since they are clearly capable of speaking "à propos" of certain topics, 
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without however, being fully rational. Once again, the "deaf and dumb", 
although "imperfect" men, show their full humanity by inventing "special 
signs" to express their thoughts.28 
Sleepwalkers, the deaf and dumb, madmen, beasts that speak or bury 
their dead… beings that are both marginal and marvelous throng onto the 
scene to confirm the rigid dualism that distinguishes and separates 
humanity from animality: no matter how perfect the most perfect of 
mammals may be, they will always be more similar to the most primitive 
and imperfect of inferior beings, like oysters or sponges, and therefore 
devoid of immortal soul. The use of borderline figures seems to be the best 
rhetorical strategy for Descartes. Standing at the limits and confines of this 
strict division, monstrosity could be understood as a synonym of 
ambivalence and interpreted as a sign of uncertainty. Instead, the intention 
is quite the opposite: to show that these figures in particular, which are 
located "at the limit", imply no ambiguity whatsoever; on the contrary, they 
confirm the rule. The theory is confirmed both at its center and its margins 
thanks to the theoretical contribution of these monstrous figures. 
It is through the subject of blindness, however, that the heuristic power 
of a certain idea of monstrosity is fully revealed. The concept occupies a 
central place in the theory of knowledge, up to Locke's Sensism and the 
Enlightenment thought of Molyneaux, Saunderson and Diderot. But it was 
Descartes who first exploited the rhetorical and theoretical depth of its 
potential. In his Dioptrique, as we know, the figure of the blind man serves to 
show how light is communicated in a straight line from the object to our 
eyes. More generally, it is used to describe the fully mechanical character of 
the "most universal and most noble" of the senses, namely, sight. 
The evocative power, for example, of the famous image somewhere 
between a dream and a nightmare that suddenly emerges in the Second 
Meditation is extraordinary. We should not be surprised at the weakness of 
our mind reflected in our improper, but common use language when we say 
video. I see this wax, but what I really should say is “I judge” what I see to be 
wax; namely, colors, shapes, and nothing more. Similarly, when I look out of 
the window and say that I see human beings, "Yet do I see any more than 
hats and coats which could conceal automatons?"29 What do these simulacra 
of truth – more properly "monsters" of the perception than of the 
imagination – come to disturb? 
What betrays us, then, is our judgement. There is nothing anomalous in 
the "imagination", i.e., in the mental representation of "images" which are 
neither true nor false per se. This is also why the chimera – yet another 
archetype of monstrosity – insinuates itself surreptitiously between man and 
heaven, or between angels and God.30 But because what is being put into 
question is the judgement, the image itself is neutralized: "whether it is a 
goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the 
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former as the latter."31 Reason will thus be given the task of intervening to 
discipline the chimera, to restore order to the reasoning, as it were. 
The same process takes place with regard to the memory, which is 
similar to the imagination in this respect. The perception is no longer what 
deceives the mind; in other words, the external reality – or its deceptive 
perspective – is not the only thing that creates false images. Chimeras are 
also produced by the memory, a mirror of internal images that, as such, do 
not come from the outside. In this instance, the monstrous imagination 
threatens the clarity of the system from within. It is not the perception that is 
deceptive, but the mind itself, through one of its most important faculties.32 
Chimeras and hippogryphs still lurk, so to speak, ready to awaken in the 
sleep of reason whenever it is distracted or absent.  
Metaphors aside, Descartes is well aware of the danger represented by 
dreaming. The radical difficulty that arises from reflecting on the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of the real has soporific or even 
narcotic-like effects.33 What is required, then, is a choice of the will: the 
choice to resist the sleep of reason so as to go deeper and reinforce it, like a 
dam holding back the monstrous fluidity of the real. Even the most 
imaginative of mental images must be anchored in reality. Even the most 
chimeric productions of the imagination must be "tamed" and brought back 
to some essential relationship with reality, no matter how minimal. This is 
suggested, once again, by reason; the need to avoid skepticism of the most 
damaging kind also demands it.  
If dreaming is what we must talk about, then Descartes will attempt to 
plant the banner of solid rationality at the heart of its territory. Although 
faint, it will act as a light in the darkness that threatens our knowledge from 
having any pretense of objectivity. Monstrosity serves once again as a 
hingepin for this delicate epistemological operation. It is explicitly alluded 
to, only to be immediately tamed by the rational process.  
There is nothing more dangerous, and at the same time more necessary, 
than thinking about reality as a dream. It is precisely when we are dreaming 
that we experience the inability to distinguish between a truth and a 
falsehood. But it is also at the heart of this terrifying idea that we find a 
foothold for escaping from this threatening mix of the oneiric and the real. 
Even in dreams, says Descartes in the First Meditation, things are 
represented like images painted on canvas (veluti pictas imagines).34 And, like 
images on a canvas, they must necessarily be minimally related to a reality 
that is ontologically prior and higher: 
For even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs with the most 
extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new 
in all respects; they simply jumble up the limbs of different 
animals. Or if perhaps they manage to think up something so new 
that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before – 
1 1 6  |  M o n s t r o s i t y  a n d  t h e  L i m i t s  o f  t h e  I n t e l l e c t  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.482 
something which is therefore completely fictitious and unreal – at 
least the colours used in the composition must be real.35 
Dream images are thus brought up as a threat, in the nightmarish possibility 
of an evaporation of the borders between reality and dreams. Immediately 
afterwards, however, they are subordinated and pegged once again to a 
minimal, albeit tenuous, principle of truth, a common denominator with 
reality: ad minimum veri colores esse debent. The jumble and composition of 
members belonging to different animals, certainly reminiscent of Horace's 
chimera, the true archetype of monstrosity,36 is not even the most 
threatening monster. Descartes pushes the idea of monstrosity even further, 
beyond the boundaries of what the Latin poet feared and condemned: more 
terrifying still is the idea of a monster that does not resemble anything, one 
that has no relationship whatsoever to any known thing (nihil omnino ei 
similar fuerit visum).  
Interestingly enough, Descartes does not discuss geometric figures, or 
even simply curved and straight lines, in order to establish a common basis 
to any possible image. Rather than geometry, what unites all the existent or 
conceivable images is color. Colors are chronologically and ontologically 
prior to forms. In this respect, Descartes is aligning himself with an ancient 
tradition going back at least to Empedocles, according to which forms are 
attained by means of colors.37 Painting imitates forms, but they are 
secondary to colors. If this conception strikes us as particularly significant in 
the Greek tradition,38 its appearance is even more astonishing in the work of 
Descartes whose effort to geometrize the world was unprecedented. The 
reason, however, is to be found precisely in the need to radicalize the 
concept of monstrosity, to free it from any resemblance to forms pre-existing 
in the human mind. The metaphor of colors once again serves to posit a type 
of monstrosity that resembles nothing else, and which makes headway 
down the dangerous route of making itself independent from the rule that 
claims dominate it. 
This is where Descartes erects his barricade, at the same time reeling in 
this extreme figure of monstrosity: no matter how remote from all the rest, 
from any other known image, this new and terrible chimera will at least be 
composed of "true" colors. This is the minimum core of truth, providing a 
foothold to climb out of the abyss of dreams and up to the surface of clear, 
rational thinking.39 Some minimal reality forms the substrate of all images, 
seu veræ, seu falsæ, and of all beings, no matter how fanciful they may be. 
Monstrosity is thus "chained" to a core of the real that serves as a basis for 
correct reasoning. This core of the real is necessary and sufficient to turn the 
deception we experience from our perception into the safety we gain from 
our reasoning. In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, the monstrous 
had to be summoned and awakened, only to be immediately tamed and 
circumscribed within a safe, reliable domain. 
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Rational Law Inside Me,  
and Universal Normativity Above Me 
This fundamentally important point cannot be overly stressed: monstrosity, 
in the peculiar forms it assumes in Descartes, is not marginal; rather, it plays 
a central role in the construction of the system. Descartes is at the same time 
"driven" to make use of monstrosity and "forced" to allude to it, only to 
immediately attempt to tame it. He is forced to do so because monstrosity 
and anomaly must necessarily be contended with by every philosophical 
system intending to construct an eternal and necessary natural order. 
The tension between the chimeras of the imagination, dreams, and false 
perception on the one hand, and the core of the real to which they are 
ontologically subordinate on the other, creates a guaranteed escape from the 
prison of skepticism and uncertainty. But if the tension between these two 
poles is the central element, it is because the rhetorical and heuristic route 
that Descartes takes is, from the outset, necessarily dualistic. Radical evil, the 
abyss of doubt, monstrosity and the chimera of false reasoning must be 
called upon from the outset in order to free oneself of them as soon as 
possible. They must be affirmed, as a monstrous hypothesis, in order for 
them to be immediately refuted. The real, the true, and the normal are 
necessarily placed in tension with the imagined, the false, and the 
monstrous. They are not ontologically prior, but they become so, in and 
through the rhetorical strategy of Cartesian thought. 
One of the passages where this successfully productive tension is most 
obvious is the dazzling beginning of the Third Meditation: "I will now shut 
my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses…"40 This is a centripetal 
movement. I need first of all to defend my position and gather around the 
central core of the self, around thought that is as pure and remote as possible 
from reality. But then I must leave this central core, moving toward the 
external, which is still uncertain and yet to be demonstrated, toward "the 
earth, sky, stars, and everything else that I apprehended with the senses." 
This time the movement is centrifugal, creating uncertainty. I am of course 
sure that I possess the ideas of the objects in my mind, but who can assure 
me as to their external existence? We must turn around and go back once 
again, returning to our own mind, focusing on elements which appear to be 
simpler, such as geometric objects. When I think of “2” and “3” as objects 
which, when added together, make “5”, do I not perhaps understand them 
clearly enough to be able to say that they exist beyond any doubt?41  
This seemingly unassailable certainty had to be conquered by force and 
justified. For Descartes, reason is not the "measure" by which to calibrate 
one's certainties. At least, not before it, too, is "measured", justified, and 
established. The result of the rational inquiry is not in danger, but the 
possibility of "really" carrying out that inquiry outside of illusion and 
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deception is. The subjective will to engage oneself in the inquiry takes on a 
decidedly central role. And the effort Descartes puts into establishing the 
foundation becomes a truly colossal undertaking. The subject is not strong 
inasmuch as he or she is originally endowed with reason, since reason is 
precisely what is being put to the test here. On the contrary, reason becomes 
strong to the degree the subject is able to assert it, in exposing himself or 
herself to the absolute, monstrous risk that he or she does not exist. The force 
of reason has no other strength, we might say, than its force. 
To accomplish this feat, Descartes does not hesitate to call on radical 
evil, through the hypotheses of the evil genius and the deceiver God. At this 
point we arrive at the heart of Cartesian theodicy, a topic that has received a 
great deal of scholarly attention.42 It is important, however, to at least recall 
that these two figures of radical evil are distinct and perform different 
functions in the Cartesian rhetoric. They represent two different types of 
monstrosities that Descartes summons and brings together so as to confront 
them and defeat them in the duel with reason.43 
The evil genius "invention" performs its function entirely in the sphere 
of nature. Without doubt a figure of radical evil, it is in itself a monster, since 
it is capable of producing the radical monstrosity of absolute deception ex 
hypothesi. It is a monstrosity, however, that "only" affects the sphere of the 
objective existence of reality, its relationship with the knowing subject, and 
the limits of perception and knowledge. One responds to this monstrosity by 
stripping oneself down and by amputating all one's potentially illusory 
features. In other words, one responds by becoming – even if only for a 
moment – the monster that the evil genius would like to condemn us to 
being: "I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood 
or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things."44 
In the act of deceiving myself, or making myself a blind, mutilated, 
intangible monster, even if only by way of hypothesis, this evil genius at the 
same time offers me the minimal core of truth I need to doubt him, at least as 
much as he leads me to doubt myself. At least in the sense that when “he” 
acts on “me,” when we are on the same plane, I will no longer be forced to 
acknowledge or grant him, even by way of hypothesis, more reality than I 
grant to myself. "As much as" he deceives me, "all the more" he irrefutably 
and indirectly demonstrates my existence to me.45 The more monstrous this 
hypothesis is, the more monstrous is the genius who gives rise to it, and the 
more clear and obvious is the avenue to follow in order to neutralize and 
"normalize" it.  
The deceiver God, on the other hand, is not limited to this fictional 
device: for Descartes it is a metaphysical “hypothesis.” What is at stake here 
is no longer limited to the external reality, the dimension we might define as 
the "horizontal" one between the knowing subject and the object of 
knowledge. What is at stake and called into doubt again is the "vertical" and 
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ontological dimension upon which the entire metaphysics and the very 
possibility of reason are founded. In His absolute freedom, the deceiver God 
assails evident and even mathematical truths. Even the principle of non-
contradiction teeters under the blows of this monster, who can see to it that 2 
plus 3 does not equal 5. 
Tullio Gregory, in an article that has not received the attention it merits, 
has tried to go beyond the view now widely accepted in the literature on the 
difference between the evil genius and the deceiver God.46 He has 
reconstructed the philosophical bases of theodicy in the context of the late-
medieval debate, going back in particular to the Occamism of Gregory of 
Rimini and Gabriel Biel. The Deus qui potest omnia of the Occamists, says 
Tullio Gregory, is not solely a metaphysical hypothesis that gets added to 
the "physical" one of the evil genius. The omnipotent and deceiver God is the 
reflection of very concrete concerns that existed and traversed the culture of 
the Cartesian age; this makes it interesting to revisit the Occamist elements 
of theodicy in a very different context than the late Medieval period in 
which Gregory of Rimini and Gabriel Biel wrote.  
Extending the interpretation of Tullio Gregory, I would argue that the 
evil genius and the deceiver God embody the monstrosity and challenge of a 
potential violation – one that is absolute and radical – to the new principle of 
universal normativity established by Descartes. If we accept the idea that 
there is a difference between the two figures, the evil genius can be said to 
demolish the order established by the universal normativity, described by 
science and concretely experienced by human beings in their daily lives. The 
deceiver God, for its part, goes even deeper, undermining the foundations of 
a possible normativity or of any possible normativity. How could I ever 
found a rational law inside me, without being able to affirm a universal 
normativity above me? 
The monstrosities of which I speak thus take on the semblance of a two-
headed monster, a Janus figure whose two heads or faces perform different 
theoretical functions, but which converge in their attack on the possible 
foundations of certainty. The physical and metaphysical planes converge for 
Descartes in this foundational teratomachy. From this perspective, I can say 
that the reinterpretation of theodicy at the dawn of the new era casts a new 
light on the whole problem. Once we acknowledge the more fundamental 
character of the threat that the deceiver God represents compared to that of 
the evil genius, it seems fair to say that Descartes shifts the problem to the 
construction of a subject capable of resisting it. This subject deploys his own 
will as a final barricade against both physical and metaphysical monstrosity. 
The dichotomy between the self and the world is profound. It is the 
rupture between a world that may not be real and a "self" that must be real, 
in so far as it places itself in front of this world. However, it is precisely the 
space of this dichotomy that enables the foundation of an impregnable core 
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of the real, at least in the eyes of Descartes. That is why the false or the 
monstrous must be summoned from the outset. Summoned, that is, into the 
heart of the foundational and absurd hypothesis (if not ab absurdo) of the evil 
genius on the physical plane, and the deceiver God on the metaphysical.  
That is why monstrosity must also necessarily be radical. The 
foundations of the whole system are to be laid on its ruins. The way out of 
skepticism is only possible through the space of this dichotomy, namely, in 
the radical separation between a twofold dimension: mine, about which I 
know nothing and can say nothing with certainty; and another one that I 
imagine as being as deceptive and monstrous as possible. But, at the exact 
instant I do so, our mutual difference is actually confirmed by the space and 
the tension between the two dimensions. The monstrous "Other", false and 
deceptive by definition, actually confirms my existence and my normal 
identity as real and not deceptive. This dualism is necessary, once again, ab 
origine.  
 
From Thauma to Knowledge: The Good Use of the Passions 
Monstrosity also produces theoretical effects of remarkable intensity in the 
sphere of the passions. Admiration, we might say, is the mother of all 
superstition. This might be one of the main conclusions arrived at by many 
of the philosophers committed to the construction of a new mechanistic 
image of the world versus the old philosophical conceptions, still imbued 
with hidden qualities, mysterious tendencies, and intentional species. 
Descartes states this repeatedly in his writings.  
The divine character and the mysterious nature of monstrosity began to 
change in the period between the 16th and 17th centuries, thanks to the 
revolutionary impetus of Cartesian ideas and his rejection of admiration. Le 
monde, L’homme and especially the Discours are fundamental stages for the 
entire philosophical and scientific thought of Western civilization. However, 
without completely calling into question the Cartesian condemnation of 
admiration, we must analyze more fully the role it plays in his overall 
system of knowledge. His was not a condemnation pure and simple. In the 
Passions of the Soul in particular, admiratio has a very complex function, and it 
would be difficult to regard it exclusively as the opening to all types of 
superstition and ignorance.  
The beginning of Meteors directly tackles the question of admiratio. We 
naturally admire things that are above us, such as celestial phenomena or 
the clouds. Although they are only a little higher than the mountains, for 
example, painters and poets depict them as the throne of God.47 The 
deliberate ambiguity of Descartes and the double meaning of "things that are 
above us," to indicate both atmospheric and "superior" phenomena, in the 
sense of heavenly and divine, can hardly escape our notice. His 
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programmatic intent immediately becomes clearer: to break the mechanism 
of admiration which ties incomprehension and ignorance, firstly, to physical 
causes, especially about atmospheric phenomena, and secondly, to 
superstition and the image of a God sitting on top of the clouds who "uses 
his own hands to open and close the gates of the winds, to water the flowers 
and hurl lightning at the rocks."  
His objective is immediately revealed: "If I explain here the nature of 
celestial phenomena, so that no longer will you admire what it gives cause to, 
in the same way will you consider it possible to discover the causes of all 
that is most admirable on the earth."48 At the end of the text, Descartes adds: 
"I hope that those who have understood everything spoken of in this treatise 
in the future will not see anything in the clouds whose causes cannot be 
easily understood or that would be cause for admiration."49 
This essay, therefore, which addresses itself to many phenomena 
traditionally considered "prodigious", like rainbows, the mother of thauma 
for the ancients, is primarily written to argue against admiration. We thus 
find ourselves in the very same domain where monsters and prodigies are 
traditionally catalogued. Descartes is attempting to use the new conceptual 
tools of mechanism in order to escape from the late-Renaissance mentality 
that still grouped all these phenomena into the same category which – albeit 
with different variations and nuances – provoked the same feeling of 
admiration and wonder. 
In this sense, admiration leads to superstition. Monstrosity is at work 
indirectly in this case. Admiratio is the affect we normally feel toward 
incomprehensible and inexplicable phenomena, but especially toward things 
that are prodigious and monstrous. However, as Daston and Park have 
shown,50 it also has a more complex and fundamental role in the overall 
dynamics of the passions and, ultimately, in the relation they have with the 
intellect and knowledge. To grasp what this role is, let us turn our attention 
to The Passions of the Soul. 
After speaking "in general", Part II of The Passions goes into detail about 
their number and order, beginning with the six primitive passions and how 
they function. Admiration – the subject of the polemical Le monde, L’homme 
and the Discourses – now becomes none other than "the first of all the 
passions."51 This is not a reversal of position, but rather the need for deeper 
examination of this "primary" passion, placed at the center of the 
relationship between the emotional sphere and the intellectual sphere. 
Admiration, we read, arises when we encounter any object that is surprising 
to us because of its novelty or because it differs from what we thought or 
believed it should be. It arises, therefore, either out of total ignorance of 
what lies before us, or from the difference between the thing as it really is 
and how we imagined it was supposed to be. It is important to note, 
moreover, that admiration arises at once, before we know whether the 
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admired object is convenient or not with our nature. This takes place before 
the movement of the passions leans toward the "favorable" or the 
"unfavorable", along the crest, for example, of esteem and love, or in the 
opposite direction, toward contempt and hatred. 
After a short list of some of the more common passions, Descartes 
presents a detailed analysis of admiration, in Articles 70 to 78. No other 
passion receives so much attention or plays such a critical role in initiating 
the mechanical process of knowledge. Given its status, the passion of 
admiration can be viewed as a "mirror", reflecting back to us not only 
Descartes' programmatic statements, but also the strong importance that the 
rare, the prodigious, the marvelous, and the monstrous hold in his system, 
summoned only to be tamed and led back under the dominion of reason. 
The ambiguity is explicit, and the balance in which the passion of 
admiration must be kept, between excess and lack, is a strong indicator that 
we have arrived at one of the fundamental kernels of Cartesian philosophy. 
The primitive passions, then, are love, hate, desire, joy, sadness, and, of 
course, admiration. It is defined as a "sudden surprise" of the mind that 
causes it to regard objects that appear to be "unusual and most strange" with 
concentrated attention.52 The monstrous clearly falls into this category. There 
are two stages to the process. First, the object assumes a certain "worthiness" 
for the mind – because of its rarity or prodigiousness or monstrosity. This 
gives rise to a movement of the spirits that reverberates both in the brain, "to 
strengthen and preserve" the impression of the object in one of its parts, as 
well as in the body, to keep the sense organs "fixed" on the situation that set 
the process into motion. 
Although this passion does not involve any change in the heart or 
blood, the force of its impact is enormous "because of the element of 
surprise, i.e. the sudden and unexpected arrival of the impression which 
changes the movement of the spirits."53 Surprise is thus the defining 
property of admiration. Its power lies in the fact that it is at its strongest 
when it first appears. After striking with all its potential, it can only subside, 
but it can never grow slowly and gradually. Similarly to how the soles of our 
feet are unaccustomed and, therefore, vulnerable to a delicate movement 
that causes a tickling sensation, yet they can walk on a rough surface and 
support the weight of the body without any problem, in the same way, the 
mind can easily handle what it is ordinarily accustomed to, but when faced 
with anything rare and out of the ordinary it becomes vulnerable to 
admiration. 
This process may cause adverse effects, since the surprise may be so 
strong that "the whole body remains as immobile as a statue, making it 
possible for only the side of the object originally presented to be perceived, 
and hence impossible for a more detailed knowledge of the object to be 
acquired." Astonishment is therefore a harmful "excess" of admiration, and 
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"it can never be other than bad."54 But this is exactly where the ambiguity 
lies. If astonishment is always bad, the admiration from which it originates 
is presented instead as necessary to acquiring knowledge in Descartes’ view. 
The usefulness or "good use" of the passions in general consists in ensuring 
that the thoughts in the mind that need to be preserved are strengthened 
and retained before they flow away, erased by other thoughts. The passions 
act as a catalyst or stabilizer of thoughts.  
Although excessive admiration may cause harm, then, by fixing the 
mind in "wonder", it is necessary to stimulate knowledge; also, wherever 
admiration is lacking, ignorance prevails. 55 It is true that the greatest risk 
comes from admiring too much rather than too little, but the fact remains 
that an inclination toward admiration "makes us disposed to acquire 
scientific knowledge." This process must necessarily be subordinate to the 
intellect and reason. However, in his analysis of admiration, Descartes seems 
to have opened the door to something new with respect to his programmatic 
statements about an exclusive interest in the general, universal, ordinary and 
normal. This is supported by what he describes as the only possible antidote 
to an excessive imperium of admiration: 
There is no remedy for excessive wonder except to acquire the 
knowledge of many things and to practise examining all those 
which may seem most unusual and strange [my italics].56 
What becomes necessary is practise with the rare and extraordinary, in other 
words, interest in what may appear prodigious or monstrous – at least until 
the intellect and reason intervene.57 We could try to express this suggestion 
of Descartes in more "modern" terms by saying that "curiosity is the mother 
of invention." But in my view this would neutralize the most interesting 
aspect to emerge from this long analysis of admiration. Curiosity must be 
directed, at least initially, toward that which appears unusual and strange. 
The difference thus stems from the motivation behind the affect. The rare, 
the singular or the monstrous must be taken as a means, and not as an end. 
Good curiositas is what inclines admiration toward the side of knowledge 
rather than wonder.58  
Now, the ambiguity and the fundamental importance of this passion, 
caused by rare, prodigious or monstrous objects and events, is that this 
impression on the brain and this "block" to the attention, both mental and 
corporeal, is both necessary to knowledge, but also potentially damaging if 
it lasts too long or is not properly quelled by reason. This "disturbing" 
presence of the monstrous inside a system whose aim is to neutralize its 
deleterious effects and the potentially "bad" admiration it may cause, is at 
the heart of the only passage in which Descartes mentions physical 
monstrosities, which we will look at closely in the following section. 
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The Monster: Degree Zero of Normality?  
Descartes explicitly discusses the issue of physical-anatomical 
monstrosities in Cogitationes circa generationem animalium. The dating of this 
text is uncertain, but according to Charles Adam, the topic begins to head 
the list of Descartes' interests at least as early as the late 1620s.59 Like all 
Cartesian treatments of the formation of life, this text does not have much 
breadth to it. Descartes remains unclear on many points and he passes too 
quickly over issues that will present the greatest challenges to scientists 
more directly involved in this field of research during the same period. Their 
discoveries soon put into question the entirely mechanistic explanations on 
the formation of the fetus that Descartes had advanced. 
The text on monsters, then, is only a short fragment, contained in a text 
whose original composition is uncertain and whose influence is limited in 
years. However, because of its location, form, and content, it takes on special 
significance in reconstructing the importance and role of the concept of 
monstrosity in Cartesian philosophy. As I will show, this passage reveals a 
tension with other fundamentally important parts of Descartes' work, 
especially 1) on the importance and existence of final causes and 2) on the 
theory of continuous creation.60 
The Cogitationes circa generationem animalium develop a strictly 
mechanistic theory on the formation of the fetus guided by the ideal of a 
"mathematical embriology".61 There is no digression and no rhetorical 
artifice: for some pages Descartes proceeds in a linear fashion to describe the 
formation of the organs and, specifically, how the sex is determined. 
Suddenly, with no warning whatsoever, we come to a passage that leaves 
the immediate field of epigenesis and a purely physical, mechanical problem 
to pose a "rhetorical" question that clearly shifts the focus to metaphysics: 
Someone will say with disdain that it is absurd to attribute a 
phenomenon as important as the formation of man to such small 
causes; but what greater cause than the eternal laws of nature is 
required? Does one want the immediate intervention of some form 
of intelligence? If so, what intelligence? God himself? Why then are 
monsters born? Would one want to see in such things the operation 
of that wise goddess of nature that owes its origin to nothing other 
than the folly of the human mind?62 
Immediately afterwards, the discussion is picked up again where it was 
broken off, continuing to explain the movement of blood. The reader is 
brought back to the physical, after being made aware of the metaphysical 
implications of the issues in question. I believe this digression is 
fundamentally important. Monstrosity is mentioned explicitly, and with a 
force that is unprecedented in the rest of his work.  
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What is Descartes' intention, then, behind this apparently dazzling 
passage in a text which, as a whole, does not aspire to a particularly 
significant impact? Monstrosity is "played" through a fully mechanicist 
reading against the other, opposing "monstrosity" which was in the opinions 
of Galen and his followers on final causes. For these followers of the Galenist 
school, the formation of man could certainly not be confined within such a 
simplistic explanation, nor could it be attributed to causes of such minor 
importance as exclusively mechanical ones. But these levibus causis were 
precisely the first step in challenging the anthropocentric theory that had 
given rise to so many misunderstandings and falsehoods. Although there 
were no doubts as to the "pre-eminence" of man, the human mind, and 
human reason over the other animals, even Descartes was always careful to 
blame the absurd anthropocentric prejudice which led to an 
incomprehension of nature and which could result, paradoxically, in 
attributing greater importance to this world than to the beyond.63 
Once the anthropocentric prejudice is weakened, man must be 
readmitted into nature, in his proper place, context, and with the proper 
role. At stake, then, are the controversies of both anthropocentrism and final 
causes, within which Descartes inserts the reference to the theme of 
monstrosity. The canonical position of Descartes, as we know, is to deny that 
the study of final causes has any utility whatsoever for physics or 
understanding nature. This argument is developed especially effectively in 
the Fourth Meditation,64 as well as in the Principia I, 28.65 At the same time, 
there is no doubt that final causes exist, over and above the limited capacity 
of human understanding. They exist in the mind of God, who has freely 
created them, as He has created us unable to grasp all His "conseils." 
Admiration resurfaces in this context, accompanied now by 
indignation, a form of envy that is not a vice.66 Indignation is a complex 
passion giving rise to both "the laughter of Democritus and the tears of 
Heraclitus." The way it works is of interest for understanding the role of 
monstrosity. People believe things should happen or present themselves in a 
certain way. When this fails to occur, the surprise causes a mixture of 
indignation and admiration to well up that is typical of people who want 
more to appear virtuous than be virtuous. There is an ethical side to this 
argument, then, that is inseparable from the epistemological aspect. Indeed, 
"it is impertinent and absurd not to confine one's indignation to the actions 
of human beings and to extend it to the works of God and nature."67 
Human beings have expectations and are ignorant. When disorder, 
chaos, and monstrosity appear unexpectedly, they provoke indignation and 
blame in us that may possibly be extended to nature and God. The argument 
of the Fourth Meditation is thus confirmed and Descartes has come full 
circle. Overall, this is a point of fundamental importance in the development 
of Cartesianism. It will leave dissatisfied both the supporters of final causes 
like Gassendi,68 and the rigid opponents of finalism like Spinoza.69 But above 
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all, it will leave the door open to a plethora of different positions, which can 
somehow be collected under the broad umbrella of Cartesianism, but which 
vary widely on the issue of how much room to grant to finalism. In my 
opinion, these vacillations in 17th-century Cartesianism were caused by an 
essential ambiguity in Descartes' text. This is not a contradiction, but rather 
an opening that makes a series of positions, even divergent ones, possible. 
The reference to monsters, in that key passage in the Cogitationes, can be 
considered a basic declaration, a sort of a "minimal" kernel essential to any 
mechanistic stance. However, it is in tension with some of Descartes' most 
important ideas, such as that of continuous creation, and the existence of 
final causes, no matter how unknowable and useless they are for the study 
of physics. The human intellect is limited, and it is therefore impossible to 
understand everything that God has created, and continues to create in the 
universe. Rather than be indignant, therefore, about what we do not 
understand, we would do better to apply ourselves to our studies and 
investigate what is within our capabilities. 
The incapacity of the human intellect to embrace all of God's works is a 
recurrent theme in Christian thought at least since Augustine. Augustine is 
also a crucial thinker for Descartes on the issue of monstrosity. The 
Augustinian position was that in no way can monsters be seen as 
imperfections. Only the ignorant define what they fail to understand as 
disorder and imperfection. The human mind is too limited to grasp the 
entire divine design, which we must posit unhesitatingly as absolutely 
perfect. That is why the problem of theodicy, ultimately, is unfounded for 
Augustine. This is not a matter of justifying God for any evil that exists in 
the world, because, in this sense, there is no such thing as evil or 
imperfection or monstrosity. 
Thinking about the imperfections and monstrosities of nature, I believe 
we can say that Descartes integrates the Augustinian attitude into his 
philosophy to a considerable degree, at least in his major works. The Fourth 
Meditation is especially significant, once again, in these terms. Not only does 
it contain the theme of our intellect being inadequate to embrace all the 
mysteries of creation, but, following Augustine, Descartes also argues for the 
need to consider what we do not understand – including imperfections and 
ourselves, in that we are "monstrously" inclined to error – in the overall 
context of the universe. From this perspective, chaos, imperfection, and 
monstrosity appear in a very different light, reabsorbed into the entire 
divine creation as a whole: 
It also occurs to me that whenever we are inquiring whether the 
works of God are perfect, we ought to look at the whole universe, 
not just at one created thing on its own. For what would perhaps 
rightly appear very imperfect if it existed on its own is quite perfect 
when its function as a part of the universe is considered.70 
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Imperfection, therefore – and, by extension, monstrosity – is a concept that 
has meaning only by isolating the object or phenomenon in question. But 
when it is considered "in mundo rationem partis", the variety of things will 
appear as an overall perfection. 
This argument tends to develop an Augustinian type of attitude, 
placing the emphasis on the limits and the defects of our understanding 
rather than on the perfection of the things "in themselves". This is an 
explanation that could be defined as both ethical and esthetic, in the sense 
that what appears to us as chaotic, monstrous and reprehensible, is not, in 
fact, when seen from a different, broader perspective, a perspective in which 
what is good and right is also beautiful. However, this explanation appears 
to be in tension with other passages in which Descartes seeks to establish his 
answers based on more strictly mechanical arguments, developing his 
arguments on a rigorously physical, mathematical basis, rather than on 
ethical or esthetic grounds. 
This tension is evident, for example, in the Replies to the Objections 
collected by Mersenne on the Second Meditation. The issue is still 
imperfection, which clearly points to the responsibility of God in creating 
monstrosity. A reply must be made, insists Mersenne, to the atheist for 
whom the existence of an infinitely good God – the absolute Being – would 
exclude the existence of any other thing, especially non-Being, evil and 
imperfections. The profoundly ethical slant of Mersenne's question cannot 
be overlooked. We might translate and summarize it as follows: Si deus est, 
unde monstra?71 
Descartes, however, here as elsewhere, tends to shift the issue out of 
ethics onto a physical-mathematical plane. It is not a matter of responding to 
Mersenne's atheist on the existence of good and evil, so much as on his "bad" 
idea of the infinite. The infinite is certainly not what excludes the existence 
of finite things. In the first place, then, the atheist commits a logical error, 
since the infinite creative potential of God hardly implies the impossibility of 
creating any finite thing. The opposite is true: God can create anything He 
wants, and the existence of the finite in no way stands in contradiction to the 
infinite.72 
This tension also emerges between the more rigidly mechanistic 
explanation of monstrosity, provided especially in the Cogitationes, and the 
idea of continuous creation, which is vital for the whole Cartesian system. 
Already in Le monde, nature is defined as matter itself, with its own qualities, 
inasmuch as it is continuously preserved by God.73 The passage is 
particularly consistent with the explanation in the Cogitationes because, once 
again, for Descartes, it is a matter of forcefully asserting that "by 'nature' 
here I do not mean some goddess or an other sort of imaginary power."74 
In nature, maintains Descartes, changes may only be improperly 
attributed to God, in that His action is immutable. And the rules according 
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to which these changes occur are precisely the "laws" of nature. God, 
therefore, continuously creates and preserves matter, which necessarily 
changes within and in accordance with such laws.75 However, the problem 
of disorder, imperfection, and monstrosity in nature remains to be resolved. 
If God continuously creates and preserves matter, where do monstrosities 
come from? Descartes now attempts to regroup "irregularities" back under 
the difference between rectilinear and curved motions, distancing himself 
once again from the position we have defined in very general terms as 
Augustinian, which views imperfections as depending solely on our 
ignorance.76 
In the mind of Descartes, once again, the physical, metaphysical and 
ethical spheres all refer to each other. It is extremely important to note, 
however, that the explanation tends to vacillate again in a very different 
direction: there is no reference here to the deceptive imagination of 
imperfections due to our ignorance. What we have now is the genuine 
"resistance" of matter, in its actual existence, to the rectilinear movement 
originally created by God. In the same way, in the actual existence of human 
will, there is resistance to the good movement originally impressed in us by 
God. 
As an interpretation of the imperfections of nature and monstrosity, this 
explanation draws more heavily on Aristotle and the resistance of matter to 
form than on Augustine and the limitations of the intellect.77 But this would 
be overreaching our interpretation. Nevertheless, a clear tension remains 
implicit in the various explanations that Descartes provides of both ethical 
and physical imperfections in nature as well as under the general category of 
divine laws. 
In his comments on Gueroult, Canguilhem suggested that there is an 
obscure point in the relationship between Cartesian biology and 
metaphysics. Only the hypothesis of the Creator-God would allow, on the 
one hand, for the subject to be understood as a substantial union between 
body and soul and, on the other, for the rigid distinction between fully 
human life and animal and mechanical life. For Canguilhem, this tension 
suggests the need to reflect on the "statistical" point of view and probability 
in biology (all biology, both human and animal). The point of view of the 
"totality", introduced by Descartes to rigidly separate human life and animal 
life leads to a dead end. In subsequent decades, the philosophy of biology 
began to question the ontological primacy of the human body, qua human, 
in order to gain access to a different set of issues, namely, regarding 
"fluctuations", "errors", successful and unsuccessful attempts.78 Although 
Canguilhem does not address the issue of monstrosity in these pages on 
Descartes,79 I hope to have shown in this article that the problem of 
monstrosity is precisely what allows the most interesting tensions in 
Cartesian philosophy to be brought into view. 
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Conclusion 
In Part III of the Principles, Descartes begins his examination of the "visible 
world". On the basis of the principles laid down in the first two parts, the 
task is now to understand all natural phenomena perceived through the 
senses. He begins by following the methodological procedure already 
described, by starting from the most general things on which all others 
depend. As soon as the scientific undertaking is about to begin, admiration 
makes its entry once again. We must start "par l’admirable structure de ce 
monde visible."80 The power and the goodness of God are infinite, while our 
intellect is very limited. Therefore, maintains Descartes, we can never go 
wrong by imagining the works of God as too perfect, but we would certainly 
go wrong by imagining it instead as having some lack or limit. The danger 
does not lie in overestimating creation, but in underestimating the infinite 
power of the Creator because of our failure to understand the created world. 
On the one hand, then, the Cartesian enterprise of reducing nature to a 
set of universal, physical-mathematical principles that embrace all 
phenomena has already begun. On the other, however, Descartes is fully 
aware of the implications, and the theoretical and theological dangers, of the 
problem of monstrosity, ones which will cause much ink to be spilled in 
Cartesian circles over the ensuing decades. He is aware of the threat that 
hangs over the whole system,81 as well as the potential that lies in the 
possibility of taming and neutralizing monstrosity, by using the questions it 
engenders to his own advantage.  
Out of this, as I hope to have demonstrated, comes the successfully 
productive tension that arises between texts that tend to present the world 
as surpassing the human intellect, stressing our finitude with respect to 
infinite, incomprehensible divine nature; and texts that tend toward 
explanations that are perhaps simpler, more limited and dissatisfying, but 
which break more forcefully with the old philosophy. The scientific 
longevity of these texts may be shorter and their influence more restricted. 
From this tension, however, comes a complex image and powerful 
theoretical function of monstrosity which tends to be masked by a one-sided 
reading of Descartes' work. Even though he lacked the intellectual and 
scientific tools to definitively put to rest the issue of monstrosity, Descartes 
fully grasped its importance and weight. In so doing, he left the door open 
for his followers to pursue one of the most interesting and fruitful problems 
of modern philosophy. 
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